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or ‘bundling’ of matters, meaning an agreed charge 
in advance for a certain amount of work, or up to a 
specific stage, which is paid privately – utilising legal 
expenses insurance which may be attached to 
house or car or business insurance; after the event 
insurance, a form of insurance obtained to cover 
the cost of having to pay the winner’s legal costs 
in the event of a failed claim or counterclaim; 
conditional fee agreements, which require clients  
to enter into a formal agreement with their solicitor 
providing for no or limited legal fees to be payable 
unless there is a defined successful outcome, and  
a success fee to be paid out of damages; and/or 
damages-based agreements which are another  
form of no-win, no-fee arrangement where the  
client is charged a straight percentage out of the 
amount won.
An increasingly important alternative to the 
litigation funding landscape is third party funding. 
Without such an alternative, parties might not be 
able to start or defend a claim thereby limiting 
access to justice. The global market for third  
party funding of both commercial litigation and 
arbitration is in excess of US$10 billion. It may  
be of surprise and/or concern to note that there is 
hardly any formal regulation of this growing sector. 
This article will explore the nature of third party 
funding as another means of financing litigation; 
its acceptance by the judiciary within England  
and Wales, and the means by which self-regulation 
of the industry has evolved through the Code  
of Conduct for members of the Association of 
Litigation Funders, along with arguments for reform.
This article considers the background to the self-regulation of third party 
funding of civil legal claims in England and Wales. It examines the means 
by which self-regulation through the Code of Conduct for the Association  
of Litigation Funders has evolved, along with arguments for reform
he process of seeking redress through 
the courts, otherwise known as litigation, 
is expensive. Despite a radical overhaul 
of the civil litigation rules of practice in 
England and Wales in 1999, designed with the 
‘overriding objective of enabling the court to deal 
with cases justly and at proportionate cost’ (Rule 
1.1(1) Civil Procedure Rules 1998), ‘it remains the 
case that for very many in society the means to fund 
litigation remains a substantial barrier to entry to the 
civil justice system even if the costs are proportionate 
costs’ (Etherton, 2018). The difficulty in using the 
courts for legal redress was increased by the passing 
of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act (2012) (‘LASPO’). This legislation 
removed financial support for most cases previously 
receiving assistance for matters involving housing, 
welfare, medical negligence, employment, debt, 
immigration and most private family law cases. The 
rationale was not purely financial in seeking to make 
substantial savings to the legal aid bill and to move 
the burden of legal costs from the public purse  
to the private sector; LASPO was also designed to 
discourage unnecessary and adversarial litigation  
at public expense. 
The effect of LASPO has been a renewed 
emphasis on alternative means by which Claimants 
can obtain financial support to pursue litigation. The 
most common form of charging by legal practitioners 
is the chargeable hour, whereby legal practitioners 
charge their clients by the time spent on a matter. 
This has been replaced in many areas by more 
sophisticated fee regimes. These include ‘parcelling’ 
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What is third party funding: Is it not illegal?
Third party funding is the provision of funds  
by an outside individual or body with no other 
pre-existing connection of its own with the parties to 
the litigation to enable a litigant to pursue or defend  
a civil claim. It may take the form of unconditional 
donations by individuals who hope for simple 
repayment in the event of success or, more often, 
payments by a commercial funder willing to take  
a risk on a claim with a view to making a profitable 
return in the event of success. A funder may provide 
the full legal costs of proceedings; part fund, or  
cover disbursements only. Profit may be calculated 
in a number of ways – such as a percentage of  
the damages or a return on the multiple of the 
investment provided. It is mainly used in commercial 
litigation and commercial and investment treaty 
arbitrations where the reward justifies the risk of  
the investment.
The landscape has become ever more complex 
as the market has expanded. It now includes brokers 
who specialise in liaising with clients, lawyers and 
funders and structuring dispute finance arrangements; 
unregulated financial entities willing to lend direct to 
clients or lawyers to support litigation; and solicitors 
who might also source funds and promote this in their 
marketing material.
Within England and Wales third party funding 
has yet to be legally regulated and is a prima facie 
breach of the ancient common law rules against 
champerty and maintenance. The Law Commission 
(1966) has described maintenance as ‘the 
procurement, by direct or indirect financial assistance, 
of another person to institute, or carry on or defend 
civil proceedings without lawful justification. 
Champerty is a particular form of maintenance, 
where the maintainer’s agreement with the litigant 
gives them a share in the proceeds or subject  
matter of the action; action referred to as ‘a 
division of the spoils’.
The concern of the courts goes back to medieval 
times and the prime issue of the protection of  
the integrity of public justice. A supporter funding 
litigation could subvert the legal process; they 
could, for instance, promote spurious or vexatious 
legal claims to suppress evidence or even suborn 
witnesses, or artificially inflate the amount of any 
damages recoverable. By these means a supporter 
could try to ensure a victory in the courts as a means 
of harassing or putting pressure on their opponents.
Attitude of the courts of England and Wales 
towards champerty and maintenance
The courts in England and Wales have taken 
a relaxed attitude toward third party funding 
arrangements in recent years, taking account of the 
exigencies of funding difficulties, and holding that 
access to justice for litigants remains paramount. A 
clear example of this approach is where the former 
MP Neil Hamilton lost his defamation claim against 
Mr Al-Fayed and was ordered to pay substantial costs. 
A large part of Mr Hamilton’s own costs had been 
paid by a fighting fund, to which several hundred 
donors had made contributions. However, they had 
no control as to how their donations were spent; 
played no part in the litigation, and their only interest 
in the outcome was that if the claim was sufficiently 
successful they expected to be repaid the amount  
of their donations. In effect, they were classic 
maintainers.  As Mr Hamilton was unable to meet the 
order for payment of Mr Al-Fayed’s costs, the latter 
applied for a non-party costs order against nine of the 
main contributors. Giving the lead judgment of the 
court, Simon Brown LJ held that the contributors were 
not liable to contribute any monies as, in his opinion, 
the legal authorities supported the view that ‘the 
unfunded party’s ability to recover his costs must  
yield to the funded party’s right of access to the 
courts to litigate the dispute in the first place’. In  
other words, access was ultimately more important  
a principle than legal costs.
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Benefits of third party funding
The obvious advantage of third party funding 
evidenced in the Hamilton case is that it promotes 
access to justice. Without the benefit of this form of 
funding a claimant may not be able to embark on 
litigation at all; the inherent risks of litigation and 
adverse costs orders are avoided by the prospective 
claimant and, perhaps controversially, third party 
funding may promote settlement. The argument  
here is that a defendant should understand that  
the claimant has funds to go to trial. Separately,  
as funders tend to operate on a commercial basis 
seeking a good return on their investment, defendants 
should be aware that the claim has been assessed  
as having good prospects of success by legal 
professionals. As a consequence a defendant may 
consider that settlement at a figure higher than 
justified by the particular case is a more sensible 
option than fighting a claimant with potentially deep 
pockets – an aspect that has also been termed ‘the 
protection racket’ principle. For the claimant, the 
nature of the commercial agreement with the third 
party funder means that the latter will not receive  
the full extent of any settlement or damages awarded 
if successful. It is a case of ‘something rather than 
nothing’ and, with third party funders setting  
claims from £1 million upwards, that can still be  
a considerable windfall for the successful claimant.
Judicial and academic support for third  
party funding
In 2009 Lord Justice Jackson was asked by the 
then Master of the Rolls, ‘to review the rules and 
principles governing the costs of civil litigation and 
to make recommendations in order to promote 
access to justice at proportionate cost’. In his final 
report in 2009 he endorsed third party funding as 
providing an additional and sometimes only means 
of funding litigation, promoting access to justice:
I accept that third party funding is still nascent 
in England and Wales and that in the first instance 
what is required is a satisfactory voluntary code, to 
which all litigation funders subscribe. At the present 
time, parties who use third party funding are 
generally commercial or similar enterprises with 
access to full legal advice. In the future, however, 
if the use of third party funding expands, then full 
statutory regulation may well be required, as 
envisaged by the Law Society (Jackson, 2009)
In 2010 the Civil Justice Council, an advisory 
non-departmental public body sponsored by the 
Ministry of Justice, issued a consultation paper 
entitled, ‘A Self-regulatory Code for Third Party 
Funding’ (Council, 2010). Legal professionals  
and third party funders were invited to consider:
1. Continuing with the status quo; or
2. Introducing self-regulation; or
3. Introducing formal regulation
The perceived difficulty with continuing with 
the status quo was that it would potentially leave 
consumers and third party funders vulnerable. 
Consumers might face attempted interference or 
influence from funders in the conduct of litigation, 
and not be adequately protected on adverse legal 
costs orders if third party funders had insufficient 
capital to pay a lost claim.  For their part, third 
party funders would potentially be vulnerable to 
claimants seeking to use champerty as an excuse 
not to pay the agreed share of a successful claim, 
or defendants avoiding paying legal costs for the 
same reason. Introducing self–regulation was viewed 
as the least expensive and practical solution and 
obviated the need for formal regulation. The difficulty 
with introducing formal regulation was that, to  
date, no UK regulator has been willing to undertake  
a formal regulatory role. Formal regulation, however, 
was the preferred option of the majority of  
consultees. Yet, recognising both the complexities and 
practicalities of the means by which full regulation 
could be achieved, self-regulation was ultimately 
identified as the preferred route in the report.
Third party funding is accepted in many 
jurisdictions across the world, without regulation. In 
Australia, third party funding has been available for 
over a decade and Australia has gone further than 
any other jurisdiction in permitting the full assignment 
of claims to third party funders, in effect permitting 
the purchase of an action (Jeffery & Katauskas Pty 
Limited v Rickard Constructions Pty Limited [2009] 
HCA 43).
Two major studies have investigated third party 
funding since the CJC report of 2010. Hodges, Peysner 
and Nurse (2012) reported that regulation would 
avoid challenges to the validity of any agreements 
regarding litigation funding; ensure the financial risk 
of withdrawal and the consequences for all parties 
was properly understood, and exhort and police good 
business practice. A key issue for Hodges, Peysner  
and Nurse was whether regulation should be along 
financial and investment lines such as that of the 
Prudential Regulation Authority, or of legal services.  
A second report (ICCA-Queen Mary, 2015) found 
that 71% of a cohort of 763 respondents surveyed 
(including academics, legal professionals, and expert 
witnesses) desired formal regulation of the industry 
with only 29% accepting collective self-regulation 
through a code of conduct by an independent body. 
Third party funding is the provision of funds by an 
outside individual or body with no other pre-existing 
connection of its own with the parties to the litigation 
to enable a litigant to pursue or defend a civil claim
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Association of Litigation Funders and the Code 
of Conduct
The response in England and Wales to the 
Jackson report was to establish the Association of 
Litigation Funders of England and Wales (ALF) on 23 
November 2011. A voluntary Code of Conduct for 
Litigation Funders was finalised and published the 
same day. The Code was amended in 2016 – it is 
short, only five pages long and requires litigants to 
sign a Litigation Funding Agreement with the funder. 
Membership is open to third party funders who have 
previously funded cases or are doing so at the time of 
their application to the Association (Art 26.1 of the 
Articles of Association). The third party funder must 
ensure the funded party has received independent 
legal advice on the terms of the Litigation Funding 
Agreement, and must not take any steps which would 
cause or be likely to cause a claimant’s lawyers to 
act in breach of their professional duties, nor must 
it seek to influence to cede control or conduct of 
the dispute to the third party funder.
Clause 9 of the Code requires that a third party 
funder must be able to maintain adequate financial 
resources to meet its obligations to fund the disputes 
it has agreed to fund; to pay all debts when they 
become due and payable; to cover a minimum 
period of 36 months aggregate funding liabilities, 
and to maintain access to a minimum of £5 million 
in capital. In addition, under Clause 13.2, if there is 
 a dispute between the third party funder and the 
client, whether it is on the terms of settlement of an 
action or on termination of the funding, ‘a binding 
opinion shall be obtained from a Queen’s Counsel 
who shall be instructed jointly or nominated by the 
Chairman of the Bar Council’. Additionally, there is  
a complaints procedure enabling an investigation  
of a third party funder by the legal counsel of the 
ALF who reports to its management board. To date 
no member of the Association of Litigation Funders 
of England and Wales has faced a formal complaint
Does self-regulation of third party funding  
in the UK work?
There are only 17 members of the Association 
of Litigation Funders of England and Wales. There are 
many more players in the field of third party funding. 
It is possible that parties are uninterested in becoming 
members because of the high capital adequacy 
requirement of £5 million. It is possible, equally, that 
third party funders are operating outside of the Code 
as they are maintaining an element of control over 
the proceedings, permissible in Australia, but not 
elsewhere. Solicitors for their part might not be overly 
cautious in seeking funder members of ALF; they  
may not inquire about insurance or capital adequacy 
because they are keen to obtain funding immediately 
for the benefit of the client to commence a claim 
without the protection offered by the ALF. In any 
event, legal professionals owe a duty of care to clients; 
are bound by professional rules, and must be insured 
to maintain their practice. They are duty bound to 
consider and investigate with their client the best 
possible financing of a claim under those rules. Whilst 
Hong Kong and Singapore have more formally 
regularised what has been a voluntary state of affairs 
in England and Wales, Australia is moving forwards. 
Later this year there is a strong possibility of the 
introduction of a licensing system of third party 
funders for class actions where a group with the same 
or similar injuries caused by the same product sue a 
Defendant. This reflects the type of claim which has 
traditionally received support in that jurisdiction with 
the more liberal approach to third party funders being 
able to direct and take over the conduct of an action 
itself (Tallis, 2018). 
Within England and Wales, the apparent 
absence of poor practice; the acceptance by the 
judiciary, legal professionals and the market of third 
party funding, and the lack of any obvious regulator, 
has meant a reluctance to intervene. The fact is 
that ‘the spirit of our age, for good or ill, has been  
to encourage voluntary regulation and limit state 
regulation except to egregious cases’ (Peysner, 2016). 
Self-regulation looks likely to remain the only way the 
sector in England and Wales will be prepared to fund 
expensive and uncertain litigation and arbitration.  
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